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A secret key shared through quantum key distribution between two cooperative players is secure against any
eavesdropping attack allowed by the laws of physics. Yet, such a key can be established only when the
quantum channel error rate due to eavesdropping or imperfect apparatus is low. Here, a practical quantum key
distribution scheme by making use of an adaptive privacy amplification procedure with two-way classical
communication is reported. Then, it is proven that the scheme generates a secret key whenever the bit error rate
of the quantum channel is less than 0.520.1A5’27.6%, thereby making it the most error resistant scheme
known to date.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.66.060302 PACS number~s!: 03.67.Dd, 89.20.Ff, 89.70.1cQuantum key distribution ~QKD! is the process of sharing
a secret bit string, known as the key, between two coopera-
tive players, commonly called Alice and Bob, by exchanging
quantum signals. Since an unknown quantum state cannot be
perfectly cloned @1,2#, any eavesdropping attempt by Eve
will almost surely disturb the transmitted quantum states.
Thus, by carefully estimating the error rate of the transmitted
quantum states, Alice and Bob know with great confidence
the quantum channel error rate, which in turn reflects the
eavesdropping rate. ~In contrast, Alice and Bob can never be
sure if Eve has eavesdropped in classical key distribution
because classical signals can be copied without being caught
in principle.! If the estimated eavesdropping rate is high,
they abort the scheme and start all over again. On the other
hand, if the estimated eavesdropping rate is low, privacy am-
plification procedure such as quantum error correction or en-
tanglement purification can be used to distill out an almost
perfectly secure key @3–5#.
It is instructive to devise a secure QKD scheme that tol-
erates as high a quantum channel error rate as possible and
subject that scheme to a vigorous cryptanalysis. Indeed,
Mayers @5# and Biham et al. @6# proved the security of the
so-called Bennett-Brassard 1984 ~BB84! QKD scheme @7#
against all kinds of attack allowed by the laws of quantum
physics. Following Mayers’ proof, a provably secure key is
established whenever the channel error rate is less than about
7%. Lo and Chau proved the security of an entanglement-
based QKD scheme @3#. By scrambling the qubits before
transmission and using the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov ar-
gument for a general quantum stabilizer code @8#, the Lo and
Chau scheme tolerates up to about 18.9% channel error.
Nonetheless, the Lo and Chau scheme requires quantum
computers and hence is not practical at the present moment.
By properly combining the essences of the Mayers as well as
Lo and Chau proofs, Shor and Preskill gave an ingenious
security proof of the BB84 scheme that applies up to 11.0%
channel error @9#. The most error resistant QKD scheme
known to date was recently found by Gottesman and Lo.
Built upon the Shor-Preskill proof, Gottesman and Lo
showed that a carefully designed privacy amplification pro-
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erant level of a QKD scheme. In particular, they proved that
the six-state QKD scheme introduced by Bruss @10# tolerates
up to about 23.7% bit error rate ~or equivalently up to about
35.5% channel error rate! @11#. Recently, Gottesman and Lo
further improved their two-way communication protocol and
showed that it generates a provably secure key up to 26.4%
bit error rate @12#. ~Here, the channel error rate and bit error
rate refer to the rate of quantum and spin-flip errors occur-
ring in the insecure noisy quantum channel, respectively.!
Here, I report an adaptive privacy amplification procedure
for the six-state scheme. Then, I prove that this procedure
enables the six-state scheme to generate a provably secure
key up to 0.520.1A5’27.6% bit error rate ~or equivalently
up to 0.7520.15A5’41.4% quantum channel error!, break-
ing the 26.4% bit error rate record of Gottesman and Lo.
This scheme is also practical, requiring no quantum com-
puter or search for asymptotically good quantum codes.
Since no BB84-based scheme can tolerate more than 25% bit
error rate @12#, the 27.6% bit error rate tolerable six-state
scheme reported here convincingly demonstrates the advan-
tage in error tolerability of the six-state scheme over BB84.
Before reporting the adaptive procedure, let me briefly
review the privacy amplification procedure introduced by
Gottesman and Lo @11#. In the first step of the Gottesman-Lo
privacy amplification procedure, Alice and Bob perform en-
tanglement purification with local quantum operation and
two-way classical communication ~LOCC2 EP!. Specifically,
they randomly pair up their corresponding bits in the string
and compare the result of a bilateral exclusive or ~BXOR! in
each pair. They keep their corresponding control bits in each
pair only if their parities agree. In the second step, Alice and
Bob apply the @3,1,3#2 phase error correction ~PEC!. This is
equivalent to randomly forming trios of the remaining bits
and replacing each trio by their corresponding parities @11#.
Alice and Bob apply LOCC2 EP and PEC alternatively until
the error rate of the resultant signal can be handled by an
asymmetric Calderbank-Shor-Steane ~CSS! quantum code
@13,14# with great confidence. Then, they apply the Shor-
Preskill error correction procedure @9# to the remaining bits
using the above CSS code. By doing so, they end up sharing
a secret key with exponentially close to 100% confidence.©2002 The American Physical Society02-1
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down the error rate whenever the channel error rate is less
than about 23.7% @11#.
The Gottesman-Lo two-way privacy amplification proce-
dure reviewed above can be improved in two ways. First,
there is no reason why one must apply LOCC2 EP and PEC
alternately. Instead, Alice and Bob should devise a suitable
privacy amplification procedure based on the estimated sx ,
sy , and sz error rates of the qubits transmitted through the
insecure noisy channel. Besides, they may use @r ,1,r#2 for
some r.3 as their phase error correction code. In fact, using
this approach, Gottesman and Lo proved that the six-state
scheme can tolerate a bit error rate up to 26.4% @12#. Second,
although the asymmetric CSS code used by Gottesman and
Lo is known to exist using Gilbert-Varshamov type of argu-
ment @13#, explicitly finding that it may be difficult, in gen-
eral. Fortunately, concatenated quantum CSS code is already
sufficient in handling the final error correction in the privacy
amplification procedure. More importantly, various concat-
enated quantum CSS codes and their decoding algorithms
are known.
Before I report my six-state scheme, I first call upon two
propositions below to study the effects of LOCC2 EP and
PEC on the error rates of the signal.
Proposition 1. Suppose Alice sends Bob several qubits
through a quantum channel whose sx , sy , and sz error
rates due to either noise or eavesdropping are px , py , and
pz , respectively. Let pI512px2py2pz . If the error suf-
fered by each qubit is independent of the other then the error
rates of the resultant qubits after going through one around
of LOCC2 EP are given by
pI
EP5
pI
21pz
2
~pI1pz!21~px1py!2
,
px
EP5
px
21py
2
~pI1pz!21~px1py!2
,
~1!
py
EP5
2pxpy
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.
Furthermore, the error rate in each of the resultant qubit after
the LOCC2 EP is independent of each other.
Proof. Recall that in the LOCC2 EP, Alice and Bob ran-
domly pair up their corresponding shares of the qubits and
apply BXOR to each pair. During the BXOR operation, any sx
error in the control qubit remains unaltered. In contrast, the
sz error of the resultant control qubit is inherited from both
the original control and the target qubits @15#. Since Alice
and Bob reject the pair if the measurement results of their
share of target qubit differ, hence the remaining control qubit
is error-free if the error operator acting on the original con-
trol and target qubits equal I ^ I or sz ^ sz . Similarly, the
remaining control qubit suffers sx , sy , and sz errors if the06030error operator acting on the original control and target qubits
equal sx ^ sx or sy ^ sy , sx ^ sy or sy ^ sx , and I ^ sz or
sz ^ I , respectively. Since error suffered by each qubit is
independent of the other, hence Eq. ~1! holds. The indepen-
dence of resultant error rates after the LOCC2 EP procedure
follows directly from the independence of channel error for
the qubits received by Bob. j
By Proposition 1 and mathematical induction, it is straight
forward to check that the error rates of the resultant qubits
after going through k rounds of LOCC2 EP are given by
pI
kEP5@~pI1pz!2
k
1~pI2pz!2
k
#/2D ,
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where D5(pI1px)2
k
1(px1py)2
k
. So whenever pI.1/2,
pI
k EP.1/2, and pz
k EP,1/2. Further, pI
k EP
,pz
k EP→1/2 and
px
k EP
,py
k EP→0 as k→‘ . That is, repeated application of
LOCC2 EP reduces sx and sy errors at the expense of pos-
sibly increasing sz and perhaps also the overall error rates.
Proposition 2. We use the notations in Proposition 1. Sup-
pose Alice and Bob divide their shared pairs into n sets each
containing r shared pairs. And then they perform one round
of PEC using the @r ,1,r#2 majority vote phase error correc-
tion code. The resultant error rates of the signal after one
round of PEC satisfy
px
PEC1py
PEC<r~px1py!,
py
PEC1pz
PEC<@4~pI1pz!~px1py!#r/2<e22r(0.52pz2py)
2
,
~3!
provided that pI.1/2. Also, the error rate in each of the
resultant qubit after PEC is independent of each other.
Proof. The idea of the proof is the same as that in Propo-
sition 1. Recall that the error syndrome of the @r ,1,r#2 phase
error correction code is given by
F 1 11 1A 
1 1
G . ~4!
So, after measuring this error syndrome, the sz error stays on
the control qubit while the sx error propagates from the con-
trol as well as all target qubits to the resultant control qubit
@15#. Therefore, upon PEC, the resultant control qubit is
spin-flip error-free whenever there is an even number of qu-
bits amongst the r of them in the same set suffering spin-flip
error. Hence, the first inequality in Eq. ~3! holds. Similarly,
the resultant control qubit suffers from phase-shift error pro-
vided that at least d(r21)/2e out of the r qubits are suffering2-2
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equals (a>@(r21)/2#(ar )(py1pz)a(pI1px)r2a. Combining
with the inequality @16#
(
k50
ln S nk D pk~12p !n2k<l2ln~12l!2(12l)n
3pln~12p !(12l)n ~5!
for 0,l,p , we conclude that the probability of having a
phase error is upper bounded by @4(pI1px)(py1pz)#r/2.
Thus, the first line of the second inequality in Eq. ~3! is
satisfied. To arrive at the second line, one simply considers
the Taylor-series expansion of ln@11(2pI12px21)#1ln@1
1(2py12pz21)# and uses the observation that all odd power
terms in the expansion are canceled. j
Proposition 2 tells us that if 0.52pz2py@Apx1py, the
phase error can be greatly reduced after one round of PEC by
choosing r’0.01/(px1py). Specifically, with this choice of
r, Eq. ~3! implies that py
PEC1pz
PEC is exponentially small
while px
PEC1py
PEC is at most about 1%.
Alice and Bob may exploit the dynamics of LOCC2 EP
and PEC to perform their privacy amplification. Specifically,
they first repeatedly apply LOCC2 EP until 0.52pz2py
@Apx1py. Then, applying PEC once will bring the overall
error rate px1py1pz down to an acceptable value. And
then, Alice and Bob may choose to use the concatenated
Steane’s seven-qubit code in the Shor-Preskill procedure. Re-
call that Steane’s seven-qubit code corrects one error out of
seven qubits @14#. Thus, as long as Alice and Bob randomly
permute the bits before applying the Shor-Preskill procedure,
the overall error rate that is almost surely tolerated by the
concatenated Steane’s seven-qubit code is equal to the small-
est positive root of the equation
12l5~12l!717~12l!6l , ~6!
namely, about 5.8%. The upshot is that the error correction
algorithm for the concatenated Steane’s seven-qubit code is
known and can be carried out efficiently.
With these two improvements in mind, I write down my
modified six-state scheme below.
~1! Alice prepares N qubits each randomly chosen from
u0&, u1& , u0&6u1& , and u0&6iu1& and sends them to Bob
@10#. Bob acknowledges the reception of the qubits and mea-
sures each of them randomly and independently along one of
the following three bases: $u0&,u1&%, $u0&6u1&%, and $u0&
6iu1&%. Then, Alice and Bob publicly announce the bases
they have used to prepare or measure each qubit. They keep
only those qubits that are prepared and measured in the same
basis.
~2! Alice and Bob estimate the channel error rate by sac-
rificing a few qubits. Specifically, they divide the qubits into
three sets according to their bases of measurement. They
randomly pick O(ln@1/e#) qubits from each set and publicly
compare the preparation and measurement results of each
chosen qubit. In this way, they know the estimated channel
error rate with standard deviation e . ~A detailed proof of this06030claim can be found in Ref. @4#.! If the estimated channel
error rate is too high, they abort the scheme and start all over
again.
~3! Using the convention that u0&, u0&2u1&, and u0&
2iu1& represent a logical 0 while the u1&, u0&1u1&, and
u0&1iu1& represent a logical 1, Alice and Bob convert their
untested measured qubits into secret strings. Then, they per-
form the following privacy amplification procedure on their
secret bit strings.
~a! They apply the LOCC2 EP procedure proposed by
Gottesman and Lo in Ref. @11#. Specifically, they randomly
pair up their corresponding secret bits and announce the pari-
ties of each pair. They keep the control bit in each pair only
if their announced parities for the pair agree. They repeat the
above LOCC2 EP procedure until there is an integer r.0
such that the estimated quantum channel error given by Eq.
~3! is less than 5%. They abort the scheme either when such
an integer r is greater than the number of remaining bits they
have or when they have used up all their bits in this proce-
dure.
~b! They apply the PEC procedure introduced by Gottes-
man and Lo in Ref. @11# using the @r ,1,r#2 majority vote
phase error correction code once. Specifically, Alice and Bob
randomly divide the resultant bits into sets each containing r
bits. They replace each set by the parity of the r bits in the
set.
~c! Alice and Bob randomly permute the order of their
remaining bits and apply the Shor-Preskill privacy amplifi-
cation procedure @9# to these bits with the concatenated Ste-
ane’s seven qubit code. The level of concatenation depends
on the estimated worst case px1py1pz given by Eq. ~3! and
the final required fidelity of the state. Specifically, suppose
that the concatenated Steane’s seven qubit code is con-
structed from two binary classical codes C1 and C2 satisfy-
ing C2,C1. Alice randomly picks a codeword uPC1 and
publicly announces the sum of u and her remaining bit string
modulo 2. Bob subtracts Alice’s announced bit string from
his own remaining bit string modulo 2; and then he applies
the C2 error correction to recover the codeword uPC1. They
use the coset u1C2 as their secret key.
To prove the security of the above scheme, I follow the
arguments of Refs. @3,9,11,17#. First, since this is a prepare-
and-then-measure scheme, any Eve’s quantum cheating strat-
egy can be reduced to a classical one @3,17#. Second, Eve
does not know how Alice and Bob group the qubit pairs in
LOCC2 EP and PEC beforehand. Hence, the resultant error
rate after going through either LOCC2 EP or PEC depends
only on the probabilities of sx , sy and sz errors and the
number of qubits transmitted @3,11#. Thus, to study the
asymptotic error tolerable rate of the above scheme, it suf-
fices to consider cheating strategies characterized only by
px , py and pz respectively. Since Alice chooses the six states
randomly and uniformly, the untested qubits can be regarded
as having passed through a depolarizing channel @11#. Hence,
Alice and Bob almost surely know that px5py5pz for their
untested qubits.
From Eq. ~3! in Proposition 2, I know that after applying
LOCC2 EP k times, PEC will bring the quantum error rate
down to, say, 5% if r50.04/(pxk EP1pyk EP) and 2r(0.52-3
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k EP2py
k EP)@1. Putting px5py5pz5(12pI)/3 into Eq.
~2!, I conclude that this is possible when k→‘ and (pI
2pz)2.(pI1pz)(px1py). This condition implies that
20pI
2210pI21.0 or pI.0.2510.15A5. In other words,
the above scheme tolerates a bit error rate up to px1py
50.520.1A5’27.6% ~which corresponds to a quantum
channel error rate of px1py1pz50.7520.15A5’41.4%).
Besides, once Alice and Bob estimate the channel error
rates, then they can efficiently compute the number of
LOCC2 EP to be applied as well as the level of concatena-
tion for the Steane’s seven qubit code to be used. Finally, the
error syndrome of the concatenated Steane’s seven-qubit
code as well as the corresponding Shor-Preskill procedure
are straight forward to compute.
The 27.6% bit error rate bound reported here shows that
the six-state scheme is more noise resistant than the BB84
scheme since no BB84 scheme can tolerate more than 25%
bit error @12#. In addition, the adaptive privacy amplification
idea can be applied to increase the error tolerant level in a06030number of QKD schemes. For instance, the above adaptive
privacy amplification procedure enables the BB84 to gener-
ate a provably secure key whenever the bit error rate is less
than 20.0% ~or equivalently, a quantum channel error rate of
less than 39.9%!. Besides, one can show the existence of a
biased entanglement-based QKD scheme requiring quantum
computers, whose key is provably secure whenever the bit
error rate is less than 33.3% @18#.
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